Briefing · Lund / Helsingborg / Copenhagen · 19–22 October 2026

Psychological defence, before Lund

The Swedish Psychological Defence Agency's fourth research conference: what the agency is, what Sweden has rebuilt since 2015, what the panels will argue about, where culture sits in total defence, how Norway differs, and who is in the room.

15-minute core · deep dives below Verified 13 October 2026 Sweden is between governments: recheck 19 Oct
One governing idea

Sweden has rebuilt a state function that Norway leaves to everyone and no one. The question nobody in either country has answered is what culture is for in it.

Sweden ran psychological defence from 1954 to 2008, abolished it, and re-created it in 2022 as a small agency (MPF, 86 staff) that coordinates others: municipalities, media, civil society, research. Its mandate is narrow on paper: foreign influence, intent to harm, protection of free opinion formation and the will to defend. In practice it keeps running into the hard edges: who gets to call something disinformation, what an agency should do when a domestic fraud narrative is amplified abroad, and what "the will to defend" is made of. The director-general writes that the culture sector is part of psychological defence. No Nordic country has given living culture a budget line or an owner in its preparedness system. The money goes to protecting heritage.

Twelve things to remember

01 · HISTORY

A Cold War invention, revived

Psychological defence was Sweden's defensive answer to great-power psychological warfare. Abolished in 2008, it came back in 2022. Swedes now treat the 14-year gap as a mistake.

02 · SIZE

A small agency that works through others

86 staff, about SEK 167m a year. It funds research, commissions studies, trains municipalities and supports media. It does not remove content.

03 · MANDATE

Foreign, intentional, harmful

"Otillbörlig informationspåverkan" is defined by actor and method, not opinion. Domestic political speech is outside it. That line is where every controversy sits.

04 · TRUST

The agency has had its own trust crisis

Its 2024 complaint against TV4's Kalla fakta was partly withdrawn and the programme was cleared. The episode is still the reference point for the "who decides" debate.

05 · WILL

Defence will is high but slipping

75% would resist an attack even if the outcome is uncertain (79% a year earlier). 20% expect an attack within five years; fifteen years ago it was 1%.

06 · ELECTION

"Nothing coordinated" is the new normal verdict

Norway 2025 and Sweden 2026 both found little targeting. Large opportunistic narratives can still circulate. The fraud story had a real trigger.

07 · RUSSIA

Control by friction, not walls

Russia's model is to make access costly: DNS removal, protocol blocking, whitelists during shutdowns. Half of Russians still read Telegram.

08 · OFFENSIVE

MPF has a wartime offensive mandate

Its ordinance lets it propose measures to reduce an attacker's capability and intent. The 2026 strategy is silent on it; Wednesday's panel is not.

09 · CULTURE

Heritage is funded, living culture is not

Every country here protects collections. None gives culture-as-meaning a budget line. Norway's white paper has the strongest words, without follow-up.

10 · EVIDENCE

Membership predicts will, not art

Swedish data show association membership co-varies with defence will. No causal study links arts participation to defence will anywhere.

11 · REGION

The Nordic three, and the Baltic three

Sweden, Finland and Norway share a security culture. The Baltic states avoid "civil defence" for its Soviet echo; Estonia's ICDS rejected "psychological defence" itself.

12 · NORWAY

Norway chose not to build an MPF

The 2025–2030 disinformation strategy says so explicitly. The work is spread across six bodies. Nobody clearly owns it.

A lens for the two days

Listen for the distance between protecting opinion formation and shaping opinion, between foreign threat and domestic vulnerability, and between will to defend as a survey number and as something people actually live. Most of the arguments at the conference sit in one of those gaps.

The days

The conference runs Tuesday afternoon to Wednesday lunch at Gamla Biskopshuset, Biskopsgatan 1, Lund. It is organised by MPF with Lund University's Psychological Defence Research Institute. There is no public website or attendee list; a participant list is handed out on arrival.

Mon 19

Arrive

Copenhagen 19:50, train to Lund (about 35–40 minutes from the airport). Late-evening Malmö–Copenhagen trains are being cut and retimed this week; check the live planner.

Tue 20

Conference day one

12:00 lunch · 13:00 opening (Magnus Hjort, James Pamment) · 13:45 panel: Elections, findings and lessons learned · 14:45 coffee (45 min) · 15:30 panel: Understanding the Russian internet · 16:30 free · 18:30 drinks · 19:00 conference dinner.

The two real conversation windows are the 14:45 coffee and the dinner.
Wed 21

Conference day two, and Helsingborg

In Lund: 09:15 panel: Frontiers in psychological defence · 11:00 panel: Developing an offensive capability · 12:00 closing. In Helsingborg, 10:15–15:00: guest teaching on SABN02, Psykologiskt försvar – individen och kulturen i totalförsvaret, Campus Helsingborg.

The Wednesday speakers can only be met if they come to Tuesday's dinner.
Thu 22

Copenhagen

Frihedsmuseet, Hofteatret, the Danish side of 9 April 1940. Airport by 18:30 for the 20:30 flight; check-in closes 19:45.

Sweden: total defence, rebuilt

Sweden decided in December 2015 to restart total-defence planning after two decades of dismantling it. NATO membership in 2024, a cross-party spending deal in 2025 and a renamed civil-defence agency in 2026 followed. Psychological defence is one strand of that rebuild.

86MPF staff at the end of 2025, in Karlstad and Solna
5.2mHouseholds sent Om krisen eller kriget kommer, November 2024
3.5%Defence spending target by 2030, up from about 2.4%; up to SEK 300bn borrowed
SEK 739mTo municipalities for civil-defence work in 2025
1954

Beredskapsnämnden för psykologiskt försvar

Set up after SOU 1953:27 to prepare a wartime organisation linking government, press and radio. "Psychological defence" was coined as the defensive counterpart to psychological warfare.

1985

Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar

Merged with the total-defence information board. Peacetime, readiness and wartime tasks, plus research.

2008

Abolished

Folded into the new MSB. The post-Cold War logic: no war, no need.

2015

Total-defence planning resumes

Government decision of 10 December: the Armed Forces and MSB restart planning for heightened readiness.

2020

SOU 2020:29

Inquiry led by Anders Danielsson, secretary Magnus Hjort. Defines psychological defence by its purpose: protecting the open democratic society, free opinion formation, and Sweden's freedom and independence.

2022

MPF opens

1 January, Karlstad. Lund's research institute is founded the same year with MPF money.

2024

"Det kan bli krig i Sverige"

Civil-defence minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin at Folk och Försvar in Sälen, 7 January. Children's helplines saw more calls; shelter searches spiked. NATO membership 7 March. New household brochure in November.

The speech became the reference point for how plainly a state should talk to its citizens about war.
2026

MCF, a strategy, an election

MSB renamed Myndigheten för civilt försvar (1 January). National strategy for psychological defence (28 July). General election 13 September.

MPF Opinioner, November 2025 (n = 1,065)
Military defence important86%
Civil defence important84%
Armed resistance if attacked75%
Psychological defence important75%
Worry AI will spread falsehoods74%
Would join total defence at risk to life65%
See the US as a problem for peace63%
Expect an attack within five years20%

MPF, Opinioner 2025, fieldwork 5–17 November 2025. Armed resistance fell from 79% the year before; seeing the US as a problem rose from 55%. Only 49% now want higher military spending.

How total defence is organised in 2026

The framework is the total-defence bill Totalförsvaret 2025–2030 (prop. 2024/25:34), approved December 2024: an armed attack is now the planning basis for civil defence. Sweden has had a dedicated minister for civil defence since 2022 (Carl-Oskar Bohlin, still in office in the caretaker government). MSB, the civil contingencies agency, became Myndigheten för civilt försvar (MCF) on 1 January 2026; saying "MSB" in Lund will date you. Its January report found civil-defence capability rising for a second year.

Municipalities are described as "central": water, care, schools, crisis communication and local psychological defence. They get money through MCF–SKR agreements (SEK 739m to municipalities and 125m to regions in 2025). MPF reports working with municipalities in half the country's counties.

Twelve preparedness sectors are defined in the ordinance (förordning 2022:524). None is cultural (see Culture below).

The 13 September 2026 election

Turnout 84.9%. S 28.0%, M 19.9%, SD 17.5%, V 8.4%, C 7.0%, KD 6.2%, MP 6.1%, L 5.3%. The opposition (S, V, C, MP) won 176 seats, the Tidö parties 173, by about 50,000 votes. Kristersson resigned and leads a caretaker government. The Speaker gave Magdalena Andersson an exploratory mandate on 18 September; she returned it on 28 September, resumed it from 5 October, and reported back on 13 October. The safe phrasing on 20 October may still be "Sweden is between governments". Figures compiled from Valmyndigheten via secondary sources; check val.se before quoting.

A note on the TV4 affair

In May 2024 TV4's Kalla fakta exposed anonymous accounts run by the Sweden Democrats. MPF reported the programme to the broadcasting regulator, arguing that archive interviews with its staff were used misleadingly, and asked for clips to be removed. It later withdrew the removal demand; the director-general conceded quality assurance had failed; emails showed contact with the Government Offices that had first been denied. The regulator cleared the programme. S declared no confidence, V asked for the DG to resign, and six complaints went to the parliamentary ombudsman (no outcome found). It is part of the agency's history and of every "who decides" discussion. It is not a subject to open with MPF staff over dinner.

What "psychological defence" means, and who argues with it

Swedes draw sharp lines between four neighbouring ideas. The conference vocabulary assumes you know them.

The whole function

Psykologiskt försvar

A whole-of-society function protecting free opinion formation and the will to defend, in peace and war. MPF coordinates it but does not own it. The DG names the culture sector as part of it.

The threat

Otillbörlig informationspåverkan

Information activities by foreign actors directed at Sweden with intent to harm and to shape perceptions, decisions or behaviour. The test is actor and method, not opinion.

An instrument

Strategisk kommunikation

Planned communication by the state or organisations. Lund's own course is titled "Strategic Communication: An Introduction to Psychological Defence".

A different agency

MIK

Media and information literacy sits with Mediemyndigheten, a cultural-policy body, not MPF. Since April 2026 it has an assignment linking reading ability and MIK to resilience, with the National Library, MCF, MPF and Kulturrådet, reporting March 2027.

Lund's teaching on the new master's breaks psychological defence into four components: resilience, threat assessment, deterrence and strategic communication. It separates external threats from internal vulnerabilities and asks students to "problematise" the roles of the state and civil society. Deterrence in the information domain (attribution, naming and shaming) is the newest and most contested of the four.

Protecting opinion formation

A state function that guards the conditions for free debate.

VERSUS
Defining the truth

Labelling content as hostile risks chilling journalism and opposition. MPF's answer: "det handlar inte om att censurera".

Foreign threat

A clean mandate: foreign actors, intent, method.

VERSUS
Domestic vulnerability

Hedvig Ördén's genealogy argues the fixation on foreignness hides the domestic conditions that make influence work.

Cognitive warfare

NATO's frame: the mind as a domain to defend.

VERSUS
Securitising citizens

Ördén (Security Dialogue 2024): the frame turns minds into a battlespace and makes brain science a security authority.

Psychological defence

Sweden's term since 1954.

VERSUS
Societal resilience

Estonia's ICDS (2012): the term is top-down and unfit for a democracy; resilience built through civil society works better.

The academic critique coming out of Lund itself

The critique is not external. Hedvig Ördén's 2025 genealogy in Cooperation and Conflict reads the 1953, 1983 and 2020 inquiries and shows information influence shifting from "a problem in war" to "an everyday threat". She argues that the Cold War war/peace distinction had in fact kept domestic vulnerabilities and resilience in view, and that the everyday framing causes many current difficulties.

The institute's NorDem working paper (Ördén, Hedling, Wrange, Smedberg, August 2026) argues that a narrow focus on content moderation, fact-checking and literacy misses democratic structures. Resilience is a capacity built before a crisis (accountability, pluralism, institutional trust, "a robust civil society") and a "joint product of state and society". It is the most natural academic anchor in the room for an argument that culture and civil society are preparedness.

Elections: what 2024–2026 taught

Tuesday's first panel. The European record since 2024 runs from an annulled election to a string of "nothing coordinated found" verdicts. The lessons are less about memes than about money, timing and domestic amplifiers.

Romania 2024

An annulled first round

The Constitutional Court annulled the 24 November result, citing a coordinated TikTok campaign for Călin Georgescu "probably of Russian origin". TikTok removed about 27,000 accounts. The Commission's DSA case against TikTok was still open with no preliminary findings in January 2026.

Annulment is a remedy with a high legitimacy cost, and effect on the vote is still disputed.
Moldova 2024–25

Money over memes

Police alleged the Shor network moved about $39m into Moldovan accounts in two months to buy votes. In September 2025 PAS held its majority with about 50%; Shor-linked parties were excluded over illicit financing.

Germany 2025

Storm-1516

More than 100 fake news sites seeded as "sleepers", then used for deepfake smears and a fake ballot video. Germany formally attributed it to Russia in December 2025, ten months after the vote.

Czechia 2025

286 TikTok accounts

5–9 million weekly views boosting SPD and Stačilo!. Czech intelligence confirmed a coordinated network in August 2026.

Norway 2025

FFI: no effective operation

FFI's final report (February 2026) found no extensive influence operation with effect against the Storting election, but notes that authentic and inauthentic, foreign and Norwegian activity are getting harder to tell apart.

Sweden 2026

"No extensive coordinated activity"

MPF and NCSC on 14 September. Separately, Svenska institutet counted about 100,000 publications discussing Swedish election fraud in 53 languages, driven largely by large migration-critical accounts. A real registration error (first estimated at 4,000 voters, later 500 or fewer) gave the narrative a trigger. Before the vote MPF had exposed "Holiday", an AI-driven network of about 1,200 X accounts, judged not election-linked.

Foreign but private amplifiers of a domestic story: who owns that?
Seven lessons the sources converge on
  1. Covert money and vote-buying do more damage than viral content.
  2. Coordinated inauthentic amplification can be detected; its electoral effect cannot be demonstrated.
  3. Public attribution tends to arrive after the vote.
  4. Domestic amplifiers blur foreign and domestic.
  5. "Nothing coordinated found" is a common, defensible verdict that can coexist with large opportunistic narratives.
  6. Annulment is costly to legitimacy.
  7. AI chatbots are a new vector of contested size. NewsGuard found Pravda-network narratives repeated 33% of the time; ISD found Russian state sources in 18% of war-related answers; a Harvard Kennedy School study found false claims in 5% and blamed data voids rather than deliberate "grooming".

The EU response is the European Democracy Shield (November 2025) and its European Centre for Democratic Resilience, working since 24 February 2026, with voluntary member-state participation.

The Russian internet in 2026

Tuesday's second panel. Russia has moved from blocking sites to raising the cost of access to everything it does not control, while pushing a state messenger. The audience has not disappeared; it has become harder to reach and more tired.

49%Russians who still read Telegram channels, March 2026 (Levada), despite throttling
469VPN services Roskomnadzor says it restricted by February 2026
30.5%Unrestricted mobile sessions in Central Russia, July 2026 (single source)
59.3%Official Duma turnout, highest since 2011; United Russia 349 of 450 seats
Law

Sovereign internet, 2019

State deep-packet-inspection boxes (TSPU) at every ISP and a national DNS. From February 2026 the FSB can order shutdowns without a court.

DNS

YouTube and WhatsApp removed

Taken out of the national DNS in February 2026. WhatsApp "completely blocked" (12 February).

Throttle

Telegram

Throttled from 10 February, largely unusable without VPN from mid-March. Not formally banned.

Replace

MAX

VK's state messenger, pre-installed on new devices. VK claims 107m registrations; unaudited.

Whitelist

Shutdowns

When mobile data is cut, only approved services work: Gosuslugi, VK, MAX, Yandex, banks. Moscow lost mobile internet for nearly three weeks in March.

VPNs, "extremist" searches and foreign agents

Using a VPN is not illegal; advertising one has been banned since March 2024. Since December 2025 Roskomnadzor blocks whole protocols rather than services; what survives disguises itself as ordinary web traffic. Telegram shipped its own traffic obfuscation in April. Duma deputies proposed a register of "white VPNs" in April 2026.

Since 1 September 2025, "deliberately searching for" extremist material is fined 3,000–5,000 rubles, with VPN use an aggravating factor. Since so much is designated extremist (Meta, FBK and others), the effect is mainly deterrence.

Since October 2025 a single administrative violation by a "foreign agent" can open a criminal case. Advertisers in foreign-agent outlets commit an offence, cutting exile media off from Russian revenue.

Exile media and the audience problem

Blocking cut exile outlets' website visits by about 22%, but their TikTok and Instagram followings doubled. Audiences come through VPNs, Telegram and YouTube and are nearly impossible to geolocate. Bumaga sells its own VPN as a revenue line. Meduza's editor describes the bigger problem as withdrawal into private life: fatigue, not lack of access. That is close to Svetlana Chuikina's concept of "distributed attention" (see People).

From 14 September 2026 independent Russian Telegram channels suddenly gained thousands of bot followers of unknown origin.

The Duma election, 18–20 September 2026

Turnout 59.32% (2021: 51.72%). United Russia about 57.8% and 349 seats; KPRF 37, LDPR 23, New People 19, A Just Russia 17. Remote e-voting in Moscow and about 33 regions. Yabloko barred; Golos co-chair Melkonyants serving five years. Kremlin insiders told Meduza the result was "secured through very dirty means". The election commission warned in advance of "unintentional disruptions to mobile communications"; no confirmed voting-day shutdowns were found.

"Developing an offensive capability"

Wednesday's last panel, chaired by Pamment with speakers from MPF/NATO StratCom COE, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and NATO HQ. The title will surprise people who think of psychological defence as purely defensive.

MPF's ordinance (SFS 2021:936) says that in war or danger of war the agency shall "propose measures aimed at reducing a potential attacker's capability and intention to attack". MPF's 2025 textbook calls this a wartime mandate for offensive influence. The July 2026 national strategy does not mention offensive measures; its four pillars are countering influence, defence will, media preparedness and international cooperation, and it asks MPF to deepen work with the Armed Forces and the signals and cyber agencies on links between cyber and influence (report due September 2027). NATO's Allied Command Transformation has developed a cognitive warfare concept since 2023, framed mostly as resilience. Sweden's open debate has mainly been about offensive cyber, not offensive influence.

Symmetry

Alicia Fjällhed: responses must stay inside the moral system used to condemn disinformation.

AND
Credibility

A defensive agency that also runs influence operations risks the peacetime trust its work depends on.

Spillover

Operations aimed abroad reach domestic audiences.

AND
Co-optation

Ukraine's information front relied on civil society and artists. A state capability may pull them in.

Culture in total defence: said, not owned

Every country in the region now says in policy that culture matters to resilience. Almost none has given it an institutional slot. Money and mandates go to heritage protection: evacuation storage, transport, digitisation. Culture as meaning, morale and community has no budget line and no owner anywhere.

0 of 12Swedish preparedness sectors that are cultural
SEK 84mSwedish money 2025–27 for evacuating and transporting heritage
§6.4.2Norway's white paper: culture supports endurance, mental health and "kampmoral"
670,000+Museum objects Ukraine reports evacuated by September 2025
Sweden: heritage protected, culture unassigned

None of the twelve preparedness sectors is cultural. The National Heritage Board is a preparedness agency but sits in no sector; the National Archives joined in 2025 under "base data". The National Library has said in writing it is not a preparedness agency; nor are Kulturrådet, SVT or SR under that ordinance (SVT and SR have emergency duties under their licences). A nine-agency council for protecting cultural heritage runs to February 2027; Kulturrådet is not a member. No Kulturrådet assignment on culture in total defence was found.

The history is richer than the present. Wartime andlig beredskap ("spiritual preparedness") was carried by the state, churches, the labour movement and folkbildning, and contested from the start (Ida Olenius, Uppsala thesis 2025). At a Folk och Kultur panel in 2025, MPF's Per Enerud said: "Kulturen formulerar hur totalförsvaret ser ut" and "där gemenskapen finns, där finns också motståndskraften".

Libraries have organised themselves: Svensk biblioteksförening's network produced a toolkit for library preparedness, centred on the information mission.

MPF-funded · January 2026

Bildkunnighet och beredskap

Bildkonst Sverige's report, by Isabelle Karlsson, Hedvig Ördén, Tarja Karlsson Häikiö and Magdalena Malm. Visual literacy includes making images: practice in artistic shaping "bidrar till analysförmåga, agens och motståndskraft". It warns that one-sided source criticism breeds the distrust disinformation wants. Recommends using art museums, cinemas and independent artists as public arenas. The closest thing to "arts as a psychological-defence capability" MPF has paid for.

MPF textbook · chapter 22

Arts, culture and psychological defence

Anna McWilliams (FOI) surveys art in war from antiquity to Ukraine: British wartime touring theatre "to remind people what they were fighting for", the Reichskulturkammer, Kalush Orchestra. Art can harm or heal; not all wartime art is propaganda; the arm's-length principle is "hard to uphold during a war". It ends on a question: "it is not clear who should be using the arts and for what purpose."

Norway: the strongest text, without follow-up

The total-preparedness white paper (Meld. St. 9 (2024–2025)) has a full section 6.4 on culture, heritage and media. Culture "kan gi mening i vanskelige tider og en følelse av tilhørighet, identitet og håp". A culture sector functioning as normally as possible in a crisis supports "utholdenhet, opprettholdelse av mental helse og kampmoral". And: "Regjeringen forutsetter at institusjoner som får statlig støtte lager planer for å ivareta vår kultur og formidle kultur, kunst- og kulturarv også under kriser."

The 2026 allocation letters checked mention heritage protection only. DSB's household advice stays material (a week's supply, water, heat), with one exception: its September 2025 guide for libraries names mental health in a crisis and "kulturelle tilbud og opplevelser som kan gi befolkningen en følelse av normalitet, fellesskap". Norway also funds about €6m of Estonian heritage-crisis work for 2026–30 through EEA/Norway Grants.

Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Ukraine

Finland is the only country where a culture-adjacent function is a named pillar: psychological resilience is the seventh vital function in the 2025 Security Strategy for Society, with its foundation "created in normal conditions". The emergency-supply agency's 2024 report asks how culture fits security of supply and notes it is outside the sector pool system. Nordregio runs a Nordic Council of Ministers project (2025–27) mapping local measures for psychological resilience, "including cultural and youth services".

Denmark's household guide (three days, not Sweden's week) has no culture angle. The argument is carried by advocates: the Danish Cultural Institute's director calls culture "the core of our bulwark"; DI and Dansk Kulturliv (February 2026) say cultural institutions are "largely absent" from preparedness; an SDU/KU humanities project holds up Norway's plan as more deliberate than Denmark's.

Estonia rejected the label rather than the function (ICDS 2012) and has very high defence will: 82% support armed resistance. Defence-league recruiters had stands at the 2025 song festival; the claim that the festival causes defence will is folk theory, not evidence.

Ukraine is the reference case everyone cites: 670,000 museum objects evacuated, 770 libraries damaged or destroyed (government figures), mandatory evacuation within 50 km of the front since February 2026, and a Kyiv theatre revival in 2023–24 read partly as coping.

What the evidence actually shows

The link from cultural participation to resilience is correlational and about democracy (voting, volunteering, pro-democratic attitudes), not defence will. MPF's own 2025 report on defence will finds that political interest, income, sex and association membership co-vary with it; culture as such is not measured. No causal or longitudinal study links arts participation to defence will in any of these countries. The policy texts assert the link; nobody has tested it. That makes it a researchable question, and MPF's research area "defence will and population resilience" is where it would belong.

The Nordic–Baltic picture

The region talks as if it shares one model. Jana Wrange's research says it does not.

Her 2024 article in the European Journal of International Security (with Rikard Bengtsson and Douglas Brommesson), based on interviews with civil servants in all eight Nordic and Baltic states, finds little shared security culture despite the talk of integration. Only "the Nordic three – Sweden, Finland and Norway" form a dense common culture. The labels differ too: Estonia and Latvia say "comprehensive national defence", Finland "comprehensive security", and Denmark, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden "total defence". The Baltic states avoid "civil defence" because of its Soviet-era associations and speak of resilience instead.

Sweden

An agency

MPF since 2022: coordination, research funding, a wartime offensive mandate, a counsellor at the embassy in Tallinn, staff seconded to Riga, Brussels and NATO HQ.

Finland

A vital function

Psychological resilience as one of seven vital functions; Ministry of Education and Culture responsibility (unverified against the strategy text).

Estonia

Strategic communication, not "psychological defence"

Coordinated from the Government Office since about 2010; volunteer layers like Propastop and the "elves"; the ICDS critique of the term.

Norway

No agency, by choice

Responsibility spread across six bodies (next section).

NorDem, the Nordic Council of Ministers project led by James Pamment (December 2024 – November 2027), compares historical and current civil and psychological defence strategies across this region. Norway sits inside its scope and is little studied in it.

Norway: a distributed model, deliberately

No Norwegian is on the programme. Norway is the obvious comparison for everyone in the room, and its choices are easy to explain badly.

The government's Strategy for Strengthening Resilience to Disinformation 2025–2030 (June 2025) says it "does not consider it appropriate to create a new agency dedicated to countering disinformation". That was despite the Total Preparedness Commission (NOU 2023:17) recommending a national function to monitor and analyse influence attempts, independent of the intelligence services. Teknologirådet called for a national psychological-defence function in 2024; MDG's national programme includes one. A 2025 article in the Norwegian psychologists' journal observed that nobody clearly owns psychological defence in Norway. 2026 is the government's Totalforsvarsåret.

Lead on hybrid threats

Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet

Leads, with a new ministerial council for preparedness from the total-preparedness white paper (Meld. St. 9 (2024–25)).

Self-preparedness

DSB

Risk and crisis communication and egenberedskap. Advice is mainly material; the 2025 library guide is the exception.

Security-act scope

NSM, PST, E-tjenesten

Influence against protected entities; public threat assessments.

Media literacy

Medietilsynet

Coordinates critical media literacy nationally and runs the surveys; hiring advisers on AI and social media in 2026.

Source awareness

Tenk

Independent foundation spun out of Faktisk.no's school programme. Proposed with NOK 20m for 2026, cut to 10m because establishment was delayed. The nearest counterpart to Thomas Nygren's work.

Research

FFI

The three-year study of foreign influence on the 2025 election (final report February 2026).

People

Everyone named on the programme, in order of appearance, plus the host and the researchers likely to be in the room. Roles checked against institution pages where possible; uncertainties are stated.

Host
Lund University · Psychological Defence Research Institute · NorDem

Jana Wrange

Researcher at Lund's Department of Communication, where the institute sits, and affiliated with LUPREP, the university's preparedness centre; the institute also lists an affiliation with the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences. She has an Estonian background: she interned at the Estonian embassy in Copenhagen (2015), worked in Estonia's Government Office around the 2017 EU presidency, and did some of her research interviews in Estonian. She studied history and political science at Malmö and Lund.

Her doctorate, Civil Defence (Re)Emerged: A Multi-Level Perspective on Policy Developments in Post-Crimea Europe (Lund, May 2025; supervisors Rikard Bengtsson and Lisa Strömbom; opponent Jan Ångström), works at three levels. In Sweden, the people who carry out civil defence work with two competing ideas of it, "territorial" (supporting the armed forces) and "societal" (keeping society running). Sweden's pre-membership dealings with NATO changed little. Across the Nordic–Baltic region, shared security culture is thinner than claimed. And the EU is better placed to build a "Civil Defence Union" than a full defence union.

Other work: a 2019 article with Bengtsson on how Estonia's small-state security looks from inside and outside, and the August 2026 NorDem working paper on democratic resilience. In NorDem (2024–27) she compares historical and current civil and psychological defence strategies across the region. She spoke at Arvamusfestival in Paide on 7 August 2026, on a panel organised by the Netherlands embassy, the Nordic Council of Ministers office in Tallinn and the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, arguing that "resilience depends not only on military and civil preparedness" but on democratic values and trust. She teaches on the new master's in total defence at Campus Helsingborg.

Connection: Estonia first. Her own work places Norway in the closest Nordic group, yet she has not studied Norway.

Tuesday · opening and elections panel
Director-General, MPF · opening, elections panel

Magnus Hjort

PhD in history (Stockholm). Senior posts at KBM, MSB and UHR; secretary of the inquiry that created MPF (SOU 2020:29); DG since September 2023. In MPF's 2025 annual report he names the culture sector among the actors that together are psychological defence. Before the 2026 election MPF judged Sweden not a priority target; afterwards it found no coordinated foreign campaign. Expect the "quiet election" analysis.

Connection: a historian who has written that culture is part of the defence.

Research coordinator, MPF · chairs elections panel

Peder Hyllengren

Author of MPF's research direction for 2026–28 and its 2026 research policy, which makes him the working contact for MPF research funding and commissioned studies. PhD from the Center for Crisis Psychology, University of Bergen (2022), on operational leadership, swift trust and moral stress. Previously at the Swedish Defence University's Centre for Societal Security and a terrorism researcher. He highlights MPF's study Historien som slagfält, on Russia's use of falsified history as a weapon.

The research direction's five areas: defence will and population resilience; threat actors; digital environments and AI; society and democracy; human cognition. Research grants close each year on 1 October; MPF commissioned 17 studies for SEK 7.1m in 2025.

Connection: a Norwegian doctorate, and "defence will" as research area one.

NATO StratCom COE, Riga · elections panel

Päivi Tampere

Head of the centre's Technical and Scientific Development branch since January 2025, the branch behind its AI and platform-manipulation research (MPF seconds an analyst there). On leave from heading strategic communications in Finland's Prime Minister's Office, a team she built from 2021. Earlier head of communications at Hybrid CoE in Helsinki and a strategic-communications expert in Estonia's Government Office. Her Tallinn University PhD, Stakeholders as Crisis Communicators, studies how publics take over crisis communication on social media (H1N1, Fukushima, an Estonian consumer boycott).

Connection: Estonia, Finland, AI and crisis communication in one person; her thesis question is what happens when the public becomes the communicator.

EEAS · elections panel

Jacob Tamm

Deputy head of the EEAS division for information integrity and countering foreign information manipulation (FIMI) since 2023. The division produces the annual FIMI threat report, runs EUvsDisinfo and the Rapid Alert System, and supports FIMI-ISAC, the network that brings civil society in. Earlier: EU delegations in Bolivia and Nigeria, Swedish embassies in Bolivia and Guatemala, UN in Brazil, civil-society organisations. Moderated a disinformation debate with the Lund institute in 2024. Probably Swedish (unconfirmed).

Connection: what FIMI analysts do is close to machine-reading foreign-language press; FIMI-ISAC is the EU route for civil-society actors.

University of Gothenburg · elections panel

Maria Solevid

Docent in political science; principal investigator of the Swedish National Election Study 2026. Work on voters' trust in elections and their administration: polling-station queues (2022), election integrity with SCB (2023), the 2024 European election. Likely to present first 2026 data on whether the fraud narratives moved trust.

Connection: weak; a Norwegian–Swedish comparison of trust in elections.

Tuesday · Russian internet panel
Lund University · co-host · chairs Russian-internet and offensive panels

James Pamment

Director of the Psychological Defence Research Institute. Researches foreign influence and hybrid threats; has advised the Swedish government, EU and NATO. Leads NorDem and the EU-funded ADAC.io; co-edited MPF's 2025 textbook with Jesper Falkheimer. Recent institute output: a December 2025 report using AI to crawl and classify Russian-language "grey-zone" sites so analysts are spared violent content; a May 2026 paper on China's United Front work and cognitive warfare; the August 2026 democratic-resilience paper.

Connection: the grey-zone pipeline raises the same questions as any machine reading of foreign-language sources: where a human still has to read the original.

Karlstad University · Russian-internet panel

Svetlana Chuikina

Defended her PhD on 27 May 2026: Infrastructuring Counterpublics: Digital Engagement and Distributed Attention in Russian Anti-War Movements, built on interviews and fieldwork with anti-war activists and ordinary people inside Russia and in exile. "Distributed attention" names how such groups compete for attention under surveillance and while scattered across countries. Visiting periods at the Scuola Normale Superiore (Florence) and the Free University of Berlin. Likely the view from below: Telegram, VPNs, exile media.

Connection: which channels an automated reader of Russian-language media would never see, and which would mislead it.

Swedish Defence University · Russian-internet panel

Patrik Oksanen

Strategic adviser at the Centre for Societal Security. Former SVT Europe correspondent; one of Sweden's best-known voices on Russian hybrid threats. Book: Rysslands hemliga krig mot Sverige (2025). Hosts the security podcast Podd72 (since 2015). Fellow of the Swedish military science academies; associated with the think tank Frivärld. Expect concrete cases of Russian operations against Sweden.

Connection: ten years of making security policy a listening habit.

Wednesday · Frontiers in psychological defence
Mid Sweden University · frontiers panel

Linda Kvarnlöf

Associate professor of sociology at the Risk and Crisis Research Centre, Östersund. Current project: A willingness to defend what? Intersectional perspectives on willingness to defend. 2026 publications: "Rethinking defence willingness" (Critical Military Studies), "The home as a site of crisis preparedness" (Journal of Risk Research), "Ellen Key och fredsviljan", "A challenged society", and the report 10 lärdomar om människors beredskapande. Earlier: spontaneous volunteers in the 2018 forest fires, rural volunteering, and a critique of "privileged prepping" in which preparedness becomes consumption.

Connection: the closest at the conference to the question of what a person needs culturally to hold out. Check whether she is at Tuesday's dinner.

Uppsala University · frontiers panel

Thomas Nygren

Professor of history and civics education; adviser to the European Commission on democratic resilience; MPF's education researcher. Projects: the News Evaluator (free teaching material), SEGA:D (serious games against disinformation, MPF-funded), AI SimEDes (AI avatars of pupils who provoke teachers so they can practise). Book: Artificial Intelligence in Schools (Cambridge, 2025). 2026 papers: "The seven roles of generative AI" in combating misinformation (informer, guardian, persuader, integrator, collaborator, teacher, playmaker; risks include cognitive outsourcing and overtrust) and, with Efimova, "Epistemic vigilance against bias and bullshit" in classroom discussions with generative AI. A 2025 study of 459 pupils found single lessons or games had almost no effect after three months; the work has to recur.

Connection: whether AI makes pupils more vigilant or more dependent. No Norwegian collaborations found; Tenk is the obvious counterpart.

Uppsala University · frontiers panel

Sten Widmalm

Professor of political science; research director of "Det öppna samhället" (MPF and Swedish Research Council). Its 2025 report Den sårbara välfärdsstaten surveys threats and harassment against police, ambulance, rescue and social services in Uppsala. Earlier work on self-censorship, political intolerance, and democracy and corruption in South Asia. Writes for Axess and Fokus. His data are also cited in MPF's defence-will report: association membership co-varies with defence will.

Connection: "democracy under pressure" could be his project's title. Are librarians, cultural workers and local journalists on the same front line?

MPF · chairs frontiers panel

Johan Österberg

Psychologist (PhD Karlstad 2018, on why young people join the armed forces). Compared the motivation of Swedish and Norwegian soldiers (2020) and conscription in six European countries (2024). Exact MPF role not public.

Connection: he has asked why soldiers serve; the open question is what civilians need to hold out.

FOI (per programme) · frontiers panel

Alicia Fjällhed

Lund PhD 2024, Strategic Moral Communication, arguing strategic communication is not inherently immoral, with the fake-news debate as case. Co-author of the 2018 MSB handbook Countering Information Influence Activities; work on foreign election interference in Sweden; training exercises for Swedish agencies, the EEAS and the UK government; the ethics chapter in MPF's textbook. FOI affiliation not confirmed online.

Connection: the ethics question Norway answered by declining to build an agency.

European Values Center, Prague · frontiers panel

Zuzana Košková

Sinologist, head of the Red Watch programme on Chinese influence since 2023; earlier at the Czech foreign ministry. TikTok: A Tool for Cognitive Warfare? (2025); 2026 pieces on China's ethnic-unity law as transnational repression and on Czech–Chinese hostage diplomacy.

Wednesday · Developing an offensive capability, and closing
MPF, seconded to NATO StratCom COE

Per-Erik Nilsson

Former FOI senior researcher; associate professor in sociology of religion (Uppsala), with books on French populism and secularism. Ukraine's Information Front (FOI 2023), "Be Brave Like Ukraine" (2024), and the textbook chapter on lessons from Ukraine. Likely to argue from Ukraine's many-voiced, civil-society-driven communication.

Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Gazmend Huskaj

Head of Global Cyber and Security Policy. Formerly the Swedish Armed Forces' director of intelligence for cyber and head of a UN intelligence cell. PhD and recent policy briefs on offensive and AI-enabled cyberspace operations.

NATO HQ, Office of Strategic Communications

Chris Riley

Former British Army officer and SFOR spokesman in Bosnia; at NATO HQ since 2005, heading its StratCom unit from 2016 (current title unconfirmed). A practitioner without publications.

MPF · closing remarks

Carsten Alvén

Senior analyst at MPF since 2022 according to an older profile, after EUAM Ukraine, MSB and police liaison work. Current role not public; closing the conference suggests a senior, probably international, one.

Likely in the room, not on the programme
Lund institute

Hedvig Ördén

Democratic resilience, institutional trust, critic of "cognitive warfare" framing; genealogy of Swedish psychological defence (2025); co-author of Guardians of Trust (on county governors and election administration), the NorDem paper and the Bildkonst report.

Lund institute

Isabelle Karlsson

Visual disinformation and visual literacy; YOUDEM (young people and democracy); coordinated the Bildkonst Sverige report on making and reading images as preparedness.

Lund · strategic communication

Jesper Falkheimer

Professor; co-editor of MPF's textbook; chairs Folkuniversitetet Syd and is Professor II at Kristiania in Oslo. Research on marginalised communities' resilience.

Lund institute

Elsa Hedling · Martina Smedberg · Elsa Isaksson

Digital diplomacy and identity (Hedling); NorDem coordination and Sweden's public communication abroad (Smedberg); AI-assisted analysis and Guardians of Trust (Isaksson).

FOI · not on the programme

Anna McWilliams

Senior researcher at FOI and adviser on heritage and culture in Swedish total defence; author of the arts-and-culture chapter in MPF's textbook. The person in this field closest to culture-as-preparedness.

Lund and Helsingborg

Gamla Biskopshuset

Built 1842–45 by Lund University as a science building (zoology, physics, chemistry), in red-brick medieval-romantic style by Carl Georg Brunius, who was also rector. In 1849 the university swapped it with the diocese for the old bishop's residence on Krafts torg, now the Historical Museum. Bishops lived there from 1855 until 1993; Bishop Thomander added the banquet hall, whose coffered ceiling Svante Thulin painted in 1898–99. The university bought it back in 1994 and uses it as its representation and conference house, with part of its art collection. It stands in Lundagård, a short walk from the cathedral.

Lund University, the institute and LUPREP

Founded 1666; nine faculties; campuses in Lund, Helsingborg and Malmö plus the School of Aviation; about 46,000 students. The Psychological Defence Research Institute was founded in 2022 with an MPF grant, belongs to the Department of Communication, and sits at Campus Helsingborg; its research is independent of its funders. LUPREP, the university-wide centre for preparedness and resilience (director Johan Bergström, LTH), started in 2025, also in Helsingborg.

The new master's in total defence and civil preparedness

One year, 60 credits, taught in Swedish at Campus Helsingborg, started autumn 2026 (advertised with 30 places; 37 students reported at the launch). An English version starts in 2027. Autumn courses: an introduction to total defence; SABN02 Psychological defence – the individual and culture in total defence; security policy in an international context; risk and vulnerability analysis. Spring: command and exercises, method, thesis. In SABN02 students analyse vulnerability and resilience in a chosen context and write their own psychological-defence strategy, including its ethics.

Hamar and Lund are twin towns

Confirmed from both sides. They belong to the same Nordic twin-town chain as Viborg, Porvoo and Dalvíkurbyggð. Nordic town twinning began in 1939 through the Norden associations; the year this chain formed is not confirmed.

Skåne and Öresund in a security frame

Since 2024 Skåne is described as the corridor for moving forces between the continent and the Nordic countries; the single fixed link lacks redundancy, which is one argument for a second Helsingborg–Helsingør crossing (party motions, not official assessments). Copenhagen Airport stopped all traffic for about four hours on 22 September 2025 after drone sightings; Danish leaders called it a hybrid attack, Russia denied involvement, nobody has been identified. In December 2024 the shadow-fleet tanker Eagle S allegedly cut Estlink 2 and four telecom cables by dragging its anchor.

Copenhagen: the other 9 April

The same morning, two answers. Thursday is a chance to see the Danish side of a story that runs through Hamar.

Denmark

German troops crossed at about 04:15. After a meeting at Amalienborg the King, Stauning and the military leadership stopped resisting; capitulation at 06:00. Sixteen Danes killed. The policy of cooperation (samarbejdspolitik) followed and is still argued over.

9 APRIL 1940
Norway

The Blücher was sunk at Drøbak at 06:22. A special train took the royal family, government and about 100 members of the Storting to Hamar, where the Storting met at 13:00, broke off at 19:40, and that night at Elverum passed the authorisation that let the government act until it could meet again in June 1945.

Places and people

Frihedsmuseet, Esplanaden 13: Tuesday–Sunday 10–17 in October, adults DKK 130. Teatermuseet i Hofteatret, Christiansborg Ridebane: the old court theatre, reopened March 2026 after restoration; Tuesday–Sunday 11–16, DKK 100. The Royal Library's Teatersamlingen (founded 1939) is a research collection: request material in advance.

Steen Andersen is a historian at Rigsarkivet. His Planerne om at eliminere Danmark (March 2026) reconstructs Warsaw Pact plans for Denmark from newly opened Polish archives. A Steen Andersen also wrote Danmark i det tyske storrum (2003) on Denmark's economic adaptation to German dominance in 1940–41; probably the same person, not confirmed.

Danish memory long centred on the resistance and the October 1943 rescue of Danish Jews; since the 1990s historians have looked hard at cooperation, recently including the royal house's contacts with Nazi Germany in the 1930s.

Danish preparedness 2024–26

Forberedt på kriser (June 2024) asks households to manage for three days, not Sweden's week: 3 litres of water per person per day, food, medicine, radio, light. About a third of Danes said they had followed it (April 2025); cost was the main reason given for not doing so. A Ministry for Societal Security and Preparedness was created in August 2024, with a DKK 608m package for 2025–26, and a new agency for national crisis coordination in January 2025.

Practical

Questions that cut through

Elections
  1. "No coordinated foreign campaign", yet about 100,000 fraud publications in 53 languages: who decides whether foreign but private amplification of a domestic story is psychological defence's business?
  2. A real registration error fed the narrative. Was there a plan for communicating a real error fast, and what would you change?
  3. Norway and Sweden both found little targeting. Low priority, missed domestic proxies, or failed operations?
  4. Has anyone measured whether chatbots changed what voters believed, or is "LLM grooming" still a supply-side finding?
  5. Moldova suggests money matters more than memes. Does any Nordic agency watch covert financing as part of psychological defence?
Russian internet
  1. Telegram is mostly unreachable, yet half of Russians read it. Is the whitelist model designed to raise the cost of access rather than block, and what should exile media build in response?
  2. Is the main constraint on anti-war counterpublics now technical or attentional: VPNs or fatigue?
  3. What do we know about MAX beyond VK's own figures: surveillance channel or mainly a utility?
  4. If an outsider read the Russian-language public every day by machine, which channels would it never see, and which would mislead it?
The concept, culture and the region
  1. MPF's DG writes that the culture sector is part of psychological defence. What would that mean for a municipal theatre, library or youth club, concretely?
  2. Association membership predicts defence will. Has anyone measured cultural participation separately, and what would a study have to show?
  3. McWilliams asks "who should be using the arts and for what purpose". Is artist-initiated work that takes up these questions inside psychological defence, or deliberately outside it?
  4. Estonia's ICDS argued the country does not need "psychological defence", only societal resilience. What would a Swede answer?
  5. Norway chose not to build an MPF. From Lund, what does Norway lose by that, and what does it avoid?
  6. Where is the line between strategic communication towards an adversary's population and an influence operation, and who signs off on crossing it?

Selected sources

  1. MPF annual report 2025
  2. MPF research direction 2026–2028
  3. MPF Opinioner 2025
  4. Falkheimer & Pamment (eds.), Psychological Defence and Information Influence (MPF 2025)
  5. MPF ordinance, SFS 2021:936
  6. SOU 2020:29, a new agency for psychological defence
  7. National strategy for psychological defence, July 2026
  8. MSB becomes MCF, January 2026
  9. Bohlin, Sälen 2024
  10. MPF/NCSC on the 2026 election
  11. SVT on MPF and Kalla fakta
  12. Ördén 2025, a genealogy of Swedish psychological defence
  13. NorDem working paper: Democratic Resilience and Malign Information Influence
  14. Wrange, Civil Defence (Re)Emerged (2025)
  15. Bildkonst Sverige, Bildkunnighet och beredskap (2026)
  16. Meld. St. 9 (2024–2025), totalberedskapsmeldingen
  17. Norway: Strategy for Strengthening Resilience to Disinformation 2025–2030
  18. FFI on foreign influence and the 2025 Storting election
  19. Finland: Security Strategy for Society, vital functions
  20. ICDS: Towards a resilient society, or why Estonia does not need "psychological defence"
  21. HRW: Russia internet shutdowns escalate (March 2026)
  22. Meduza on Telegram's blocking
  23. Meduza on the 2026 Duma election
  24. Re:Russia on exile media audiences
  25. HKS Misinformation Review on chatbots and Kremlin disinformation
  26. Lund: SABN02 course plan
  27. Lund: Psychological Defence Research Institute
  28. Stortinget: 9 April 1940 and Elverum
  29. lex.dk: 9 April 1940 in Denmark
  30. Rigsarkivet: Steen Andersen's Warsaw Pact research

Compiled 13 October 2026 from public sources. Unconfirmed details are flagged in the text. Sweden's government formation was unresolved on that date. Speaker roles come from the conference programme; attendance beyond the programme is not known in advance.

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